The Krauthammer Strikes Again

It is difficult to tell just how seriously Charles Krauthammer intends us to take his latest column. Commenting that former Colombian presidential Ingrid Betancourt candidate was freed by military force after years of appeals on her behalf failed, Krauthammer pushes this well past its logical conclusion and appears to use this as an argument that military force is always the answer. Again, it is hard to tell if he actually means all he is saying, but the apparent conclusion of his column is soft power counts for nothing; diplomacy is worthless; only military force ever achieves anything; war is therefore always the best response. Let's invade Darfur, Burma and Zimbabwe so we can put an end to the people's sufferings there, just as we freed the suffering Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein and established such a model democracy there.

This is the same man who, in the wake of 9-11, said it was all Bill Clinton's fault for squandering 8 year that he could have used invading Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Events since them have apparently done nothing to suggest to him that there might be limits to American military power.

Charles Krauthammer is a professional psychiatrist. Maybe he should check is own head out.

Iraq: Not a Legitimate Humanitarian Intervention

Rich Lowry of the National Review has written a column defending Tony Blair as an honest and consistent liberal interventionist and condemning his critics as hypocrites. Why, Lowry asks, did so many liberal interventionists favor humanitarian intervention during the Clinton Administration and then change their minds as soon as a conservative Republican endorsed it. Why did they dismiss Tony Blair as a "poodle" for sticking to his old principles? Why would an advocate of liberal intervention oppose the invasion of Iraq, other than sheer partisanship?

As a supporter of humanitarian intervention myself, how do I defend opposing the invasion of Iraq? As an answer, let me run down the five guidelines recommended by the International Crisis Group and see how well they fit in the case of Iraq.

1) Just Cause: Is there serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur [such as mass killing or ethnic cleansing]? The answer here was no. That Saddam Hussein was an extremely brutal and oppressive ruler no one disputes. At other times during his reign, particularly when he bloodily suppressed Kurdish and Shiite revolts, humanitarian intervention would have been justified. But the last such crisis had been in the wake of the Gulf War in 1991. After the revolt was defeated, there was a brutal and oppressive regime in power, but no crisis so grave as to justify military intervention. Atrocities committed twelve years ago do not justify an invasion here and now. Absent an immediate humanitarian crisis, the other criteria are moot, but I will address them nonetheless.

(2) Right Intention: is the primary purpose of the proposed military action to halt or avert human suffering, whatever other motives may be in play? I would qualify this requirement and permit interventions in which the primary motive is legitimate self-interest, so long as humanitarian motives are present and imperialist motives are absent. By these standards, the invasion of Iraq triply fails. The Bush administration did not claim that they were launching a humanitarian intervention; they said they were invading to get rid of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Like most people at the time, I did not question that Saddam had such an arsenal. But I did not see his arsenal as any threat to us, so the intervention could not be justified as legitimate self-interest. Saddam's arsenal might be a threat to his neighbors so acting in conjunction with them to remove Saddam might be seen as defending someone else's legitimate self-interest. But the neighbors did not seem concerned. As for humanitarian motives, some people in the Bush Administration probably had them, but in the absence of an immediate humanitarian crisis, they were not sufficient to justify the war. And as for imperialist motives, the invasion of Iraq was touted as part of Bush's general strategy of preemption; the doctrine that we were allowed to invade any country we wanted at will. That is the very definition of imperialism.

(3) Last Resort: has every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures will not succeed? It seems reasonable to assume that nothing short a direct invasion would have gotten rid of Saddam. But, absent an actual crisis, this does not justify intervention on humanitarian grounds.

(4) Proportional Means: is the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military action the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective? Our problem was the opposite, that we did not have enough forces to secure the country. This problem is endemic to humanitarian interventions.

(5) Reasonable Prospects: Will intervention just make things worse? This one scarcely merits an answer. The question that will long be debated is whether a more competent occupation would have been more successful.

So, there were good reasons other than simple partisanship to oppose George Bush's invasion of Iraq. In this case, however, even purely partisan opposition would have been justified. Liberal/ humanitarian intervention belongs on the (growing) list of things conservatives do not do well. A distrust of this sort of mission ran throughout the Administration from the hawkish Cheney, who ran for office saying he opposed "nation building" and that the proper role of the army was waging war, to the dovish Powell, who said that military operations should include overwhelming force, defined objectives, and a clear exit strategy. People who at their core oppose humanitarian intervention and nation building are unlikely to do a good job of it. And when they claim to be undertaking such a mission, their statements should be regarded with skepticism.

Again on Humanitarian Intervention

In a previous post, I discussed what could be learned about humanitarian intervention from three such interventions not involving the United States. This post will discuss the International Crisis Group's guidelines for humanitarian intervention and see how well they apply in these three cases.

The International Crisis Group proposes five guidelines to determine whether humanitarian intervention is justified:

1) Just Cause: Is there serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur [such as mass killing or ethnic cleansing, but not "mere" oppression on a lesser scale]?

(2) Right Intention: is the primary purpose of the proposed military action to halt or avert human suffering, whatever other motives may be in play?

(3) Last Resort: has every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures will not succeed? [There may not be time to actually try non-military options, but there must be reasonable grounds to believe such measures would fail].

(4) Proportional Means: is the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military action the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective?

(5)Reasonable Prospects: is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?

How well do the three non-US interventions meet these guidelines:

Bangladesh:

1. Was there "serious and irreparable harm" occuring on such a scale as to justify military intervention? Yes, there was a savage war with one to three million people killed and 12 million driven from their homes.

2. Was India's primary motive humanitarian? No, India's primary motive was to be freed of the burden of 12 million Bengali refugees fleeing the war.

3. Could non-military options be ruled out? A difficulty question, since the Pakistanis were fighting what amounted to a foreign war and had to be supplied by air. Could India have halted the war by stopping air traffic? Most likely such an action would have led to war anyhow.

4. Did India use the minimum necessary force? Yes. The Indian Army attacked with overwhelming force, which was necessary to defeat the Pakistanis quickly. They withdrew within a few months.

5. Was there a reasonable prospect of success? The intervention succeeded in ending a terrible war, so the answer must be yes.

Cambodia:

1. Was there "serious and irreparable harm" occuring on such a scale as to justify military intervention? Yes, relative to population the Khmer Rouge was one of the bloodiest regimes ever.

2. Was Vietnam's primary motive humanitarian? No, Vietnam was responding to senseless border attacks by the Khmer Rouge.

3. Could non-military options be ruled out? It seems unlikely the Khmer Rouge would have responded to anything short of war.

4. Did Vietnam use the minimum necessary force? The initial scale of intervention was appropriate. The duration was clearly excessive, and Vietnam's quasi-colonial behavior probably prolonged the conflict.

5. Was there a reasonable prospect of success? The intervention ended the ghastly slaughter, even if a lower-level conflict continued, so the answer must be yes.

Uganda:

1. Was there "serious and irreparable harm" occuring on such a scale as to justify military intervention? A close call. Idi Amin was a bloodthirsty tyrant, and by some accounts as many as one Ugandan in 40 was killed during his reign. But there was not so grave a crisis as in the other cases.

2. Was Tanzania's primary motive humanitarian? More so than in the other cases, but the primary motive was retaliation for a Ugandan invasion of Tanzania.

3. Could non-military options be ruled out? Idi Amin could have been assasinated, but the harm he did Uganda would have remained.

4. Did Tanzania use the minimum necessary force? The initial scale of intervention was, if anything, inadequate to secure the country. But Tanzania's continued meddling and attempts to dominate may have contributed to the later breakdown in order.

5. Was there a reasonable prospect of success? This intervention must be accounted a failure, since it led to a civil war every bit as bloody as Amin's rule.

Conclusion

Considering, then, how the International Crisis Group's guidelines have applied to real world humanitarian interventions, are they sound rules?

1. "Serious and irreparable harm." This guideline is the most important. Humanitarian intervention is justified only under the threat of "serious and irreparable harm."

2. Right intentions. This one is more problematic. Self interest will always be the main reason nations go to war. In all three cases, the intervening country was acting primarily out of self-interest. Indeed, one can argue that intervenors whose interests are at stake are more likely to take their responsibilities seriously than ones acting out of purely humanitarian motives. It certainly is true that a false humanitarian concern should not be a mere excuse for a power grab. A better formulation would be that legitimate self-interest may be the primary motive, so long as humanitarian concerns are secondary and imperialist motives are absent.

3. Last resort. Certainly if non-military options will stop the killing, they are preferable. But usually the time to use them was well before the killing starts.

4. Minimum force. Humanitarian intervention is a labor-intensive business that involves securing the whole country and protecting the whole population. The problem is usually not excessive force, but insufficient resources to do the job (as in Uganda). However, this guideline is sound if it means that the intervenor should stick to human protection and not branch out into imperialism (as did Vietnam in Cambodia). A better guideline here would be that that the intervenor must be willing both to commit sufficient resources to offer adequate protection, and to limit their use to human protection.

5. Reasonable prospects. This guideline is the second most important after "serious and irreparable harm." Indeed, one could argue it is even more important. If a humanitarian intervention is unlikely to succeed, it is best not attempted. The question, of course, is how to know its prospects.

Lessons from Humanitarian Interventions

We have reviewed three humanitarian interventions not involving the United States, in Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Uganda. All three took place in the 1970's, before the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was generally accepted, and therefore generated considerable international opposition.

What lessons do these three examples teach us about humanitarian intervention?

Intervention can be justified even if the intervenor's motives are not entirely pure. One of the main reasons many people oppose U.S. humanitarian interventions is the fear that they will be mere excuses for power grabs. Certainly there was an element of power grab in all three cases here. Vietnam was deposing a hostile government and attempting to install a puppet regime. Tanzania's motives were similar, tough less overt. India was splitting a hostile country in two and seeking to install a more friendly regime in one half. Yet surely these power grabs were lesser evils than the ongoing slaughter. In international politics, motives of self-interest are probably impossible to eliminate. The best way to keep humanitarianism from being a mere excuse for power grabs is to establish clear standards as to what is and is not a serious enough crisis to justify military action.

As a matter of pure self-interest, most countries have legitimate reasons not to want humanitarian crises next door. Deranged, irrational regimes do not necessarily confine their atrocities within their own borders. Both Vietnam and Tanzania invaded only in response to unprovoked attacks. India was burdened with millions of refugees, another predictable result of a humanitarian crises. And, although not an issue in any of these cases, civil wars have a tendancy to spread and destablize neighboring countries. Thailand, though also a victim of Khmer Rouge attacks, nonetheless harbored and supported the Khmer Rouge out of fear of further Vietnamese aggression. Humanitarian interventions should include security guaranties for neighboring countries, and neighboring countries may be persuaded to support them.

Humanitarian interventions can fail, and have their costs even when successful. War is never cost-free. India's intervention was by far the most successul, sweeping up the Pakistani army in twelve days and putting a decisive end to the war. Even in so short a time, however, the Pakistanis were able to go on one last killing spree. And the Indian army was not able to keep Bengalis from engaging in savage reprisals against the Bihiris. Vietnam initially scattered, rather than routed, the Khmer Rouge. At first, the countryside remained insecure and the Khmer Rouge was able to return and terrorize the population. Even once most of the countryside was secured, a long war continued against stubborn remnants based in Thailand. However, a war in which 60,000 people are killed over 10 years dwarfs a regime which slaughters 1 to 3 million people in less than four years. Vietnam's intervention must be considered a humanitarian success, though less so than India's. Tanzanian forces were able to route Idi Amin's army, but not to prevent Uganda from disintigrating into civil war. Although the civil war came to an end after five years, it cost as many lives as the Amin regime. Tanzania's intervention must be considered a humanitarian failure.

Seizing the country is easy; securing it is the hard part. Army's whose main role is to abuse and terrorize civilians can rarely stand up to serious military challange. The Indian army routed the Pakistani forces in twelve days. The Vietnamese army seized Phnom Pehn within two weeks. The far less professional Tanzanian army took slightly longer, but encountered little resistance. It took longer, however, for the Vietnamese forces to establish real control, and they never did in border areas. The Tanzanians were unable to establish security, and Uganda dissolved into civil war. India, on the other hand, was dislodging what amounted to a foreign invader, accepted the unconditional surrender of the Pakistani forces, and encountered no further resistance. Removing a foreign invader is much easier than removing a domestic killer.

It is easier to secure ethnically uniform countries than ethnically varied ones. Bangladesh was overwhelmingly Bengali. Savage reprisals occurred against the Bihari minority, but the Biharis were not numerous enough to fight a civil war. The Bengalis had a significant religious divide between Muslims and Hindus, but ultimately considered themselves Bengalis first. Cambodia had some ethnic minorities, but was overwhelmingly Khmer (Cambodian), and it was never in doubt that the Khmers would be dominant. It is entirely plausible that the Vietnamese prolonged the war by attempting to dominate the country and settling in large numbers, thus raising fears of Vietnamese dominance and encouraging even resistance, even by enemies of the Khmer Rouge. Uganda was hopelessly ethnically fragmented and, like many African countries, suffered from tribal rivalries. Much of the civil war that followed Amin's overthrow had a strong ethnic component, as the Langi and Acholi tribes sought to dominate the army and, through it, the country and other Ugandans resisted. The current Lord's Resistance Army is active mostly among the Acholi.

Being bigger and stronger helps. India had a population substantially larger than Pakistan, a fairly well-trained army, and was fighting a West Pakistani force in an area geographically non-contiguous to West Pakistan, which caused the Pakistanis obvious logistical problems. Vietnam had ten times the population of Cambodia, and its army was seasoned. Tanzania is one of the stronger states in Africa, but did not have anything like the well-trained armies of India or Vietnam.

Finally, even sucessful humanitarian interventions do not achieve miracles. India's intervention was by far the most successful in that it brought a full and final end to the war. But Bangladesh remains troubled at best and turbulent at worst. Vietnam ended Khmer Rouge atrocities, only to usher in a low level war. Cambodia, too, remains troubled. And the Tanzanian intervention led to civil war. Humanitarian intervenors should not expect to create the perfect government or a social paradise. Ending the immediate humanitarian crisis and not provoking a new one is the best one can expect.

Humanitarian Interventions -- Uganda, 1979

The least controversial of the three humanitarian interventions of the 1970's was also the least successful -- Tanzania's invasion of Uganda to depose Idi Amin.

Uganda's viability was doubtful from the start. When modern Uganda became independent, it consisted of the autonomous kingdom of Buganda and four other kingdoms, as well as various tribes, all combined into a single nation-state. Uganda was also divided between Nilotic-speaking tribes in the north and Bantu-speaking tribes in the south. The bulk of Uganda's business class consisted of much-resented Asians. Attempting to rule this complex conglomeration was the socialist Milton Obote. Obote ruled autocratically, suppressing the autonomy of the kingdoms within Uganda, and increasingly relying on the military to enforce his power. Although Obote packed the army with his own Lango tribe and the Acholi tribe, the leader of the army was Idi Amin, a Muslim (in a predominantly Christian country) and a member of the Kakwa tribe.

As Amin's power grew, Obote increasingly began to see him as a threat and planned his removal. Amin pre-empted the attack in 1971 by seizing power while Obote was out of the country. Ethnic and religious factors played a part in the brutality of Idi Amin's rule, but first and foremost was ineptitude and paranoia of an unbalanced man in a role far beyond his ability.

Amin began with a murderous purge of Lango and Acholi members of the military, favoring his own Kakwa tribe, and extended his reign of terror to the population at large. He expelled Asians from Uganda and confiscated their property, which was turned over to members of the army.

This expropriation of property proved disastrous for the already declining economy. Businesses were run into the ground, cement factories at Tororo and Fort Portal collapsed from lack of maintenance, and sugar production literally ground to a halt, as unmaintained machinery jammed permanently. Uganda's export crops were sold by government parastatals, but most of the foreign currency they earned went for purchasing imports for the army.

Idi Amin became known for his eccentric an erratic behavior that made him a laughing stock throughout the world. He was known for making absurd pronouncements, awarding himself meaningless medals and titles, calling himself "the white man's burden," and being carried around in a chair by four Englishmen. He cultivated a friendship with fellow Muslim and eccentric Muammar Qaddafi, though many people suspected his devotion to Islam was mostly an excuse to practice polygamy and share in Arab oil wealth. But his regime's complete lack of ability to manage as large a job as running a country was no laughing matter.

Because he was illiterate — a disability shared with most of his higher ranking officers — Amin relayed orders and policy decisions orally by telephone, over the radio, and in long rambling speeches to which civil servants learned to pay close attention. The bureaucracy became paralyzed as government administrators feared to make what might prove to be a wrong decision. The minister of defense demanded and was given the Ministry of Education office building, but then the decision was reversed. Important education files were lost during their transfer back and forth by wheelbarrow

Amin became increasingly erratic and paranoid and enforced his power largely by torture and murder. The number of people killed under his regime is unknown, but estimates range from 100,000 to 500,000, andy may have amounted to one Ugandan in 40.

In 1978, Amin's army invaded neighboring Tanzania and seized 710 square miles of territory. Tanzania's president, Julius Nyrere, a longtime enemy of Amin who harbored Obote in exile, saw this as a good opportunity to get rid of his rival altogether. Nyrere expanded the Tanzania Army from 40,000 to 100,000 and counter-invaded in 1979. The Ugandan forces crumbled before the Tanzanian advance. Qadaffi sent some 3,000 troops to Uganda to defend Amin, but they, too, were routed. In April, 1979, the Tanzanians seized the Ugandan capital of Kampala, and Amin fled to Libya.

Unlike the Bangladesh or Cambodia interventions, Cold War politics played little role in Uganda. Idi Amin showed some skill playing superpowers off against each other, but was no one's ally. His eccentric behavior, as much as his murderous brutality, had made him an embarrassment everyone was glad to be rid of. There was, therefore, little international opposition to the Tanzanian invasion, in marked contrast to the strong condemnation of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, which had happened only a few months earlier.

The removal of Amin did not, however, bring peace to Uganda. After the route of Amin's army, it was replaced with a force of 1,000 Ugandans who had fought alongside the Tanzanians during the invasion. Ugandan leadership was divided among rival factions, who began forming their own private armies. Nyrere continued to manipulate events from behind the scenes, restoring the unpopular Obote to power in 1980 in an election generally believed to be rigged. Civil war broke out in 1981. Yoweri Museveni leading the National Resistance Army revolted against Obote and civil war ensued. Obote once again packed the army with Lango and Acholi tribesmen and set out to brutally crush the rebellion. Civilian deaths in this war have been estimated at 500,000, comparable to those killed by Amin. At least 750,000 people were also displaced. Museveni ultimately prevailed in 1986, brought an end to the civil war, and began Uganda's recovery. A small but brutal group of rebels known as the Lord's Resistance Army continues to be active in northern Uganda.

Given Tanzania's ultimate inability to restore order to Uganda and the ferocity of the civil war that followed, this humanitarian intervention must be judged as a failure.

Humanitarian Interventions -- Cambodia, 1979

The second major humanitarian of the 1970's was Vietnam's 1979 invasion of Cambodia to expel the murderous Khmer Rouge. Although the invasion can certainly be defended on humanitarian grounds, the entire episode does not reflect favorably on anyone -- including the Vietnamese government.

The Khmer Rouge began as a Communist insurgency against the Cambodian government, trained and supported by, and largely subordinate to, the larger and more powerful Vietnamese Communist party. Originally a minor force, the Khmer Rouge became powerful when the unpopular (pro U.S.) government of Lon Nol took over and U.S. forces attempted to subdue the Communists by bombing. Civil War followed from 1970 until 1975, when the Khmer Rouge took over and quickly proved itself to be one of the most bloodthirsty governments of all time.

Although the Khmer Rouge singled ethnic and religious minorities out for special persecution, the primary driving force behind the regime's extraordinary savagery appears to have been a fanatically doctrinaire of Communism, exceeding even the dogmatism of Stalin or Mao.

Cambodians were essentially classified into three groups. The elite, including anyone with wealth or education, were to be executed en masse. Urban residents (including peasant refugees who fled the civil war in the countryside) were classified as "new people" and force-marched into the countryside and put to slave labor, where many died of exhaustion and starvation. The Khmer Rouge motto toward new people was, "To keep you is no benefit. To destroy you is no loss." Only undisplaced rural peasants, or "old people" were not considered class enemies. Modern medicine was banned as a foreign intrusion, and many people died of disease as a result.

The Wikipedia describes conditions as follows:

In order to save ammunition, they used simple weapons like pickaxes and ax handles to carry out executions. People were executed for not working hard enough, complaining about living conditions, collecting or stealing food for their own use, wearing jewelry, having sexual relations, grieving over the loss of relatives or friends, or expressing religious sentiments. Even something as simple as wearing eye glasses could result in execution because the Khmer Rouge associated it with Western intellectualism. Sick people were often killed.

And

Family relationships not sanctioned by the state were also banned, and family members could be put to death for communicating with each other. In any case, family members were often relocated to different parts of the country with all postal and telephone services abolished. The total lack of agricultural knowledge by the former city dwellers made famine inevitable. Rural dwellers were often unsympathetic or too frightened to assist them. Such acts as picking wild fruit or berries was seen as "private enterprise" for which the death penalty applied.

The total number of people killed by the Khmer Rouge is unknown. Estimates range from a low of 750,000 to a high of 3 million, with most estimates in the 1 to 2 million range, out of a starting population of 7 to 8 million. This means that the Khmer Rouge directly or indirectly killed off at least a tenth and perhaps as much as 30% of the total population over a period of four years. This dwarfs the number of people killed in the civil war leading to the Khmer Rouge. The absolute number of people killed by the Khmer Rouge is similar in absolute terms to the number killed in the the Bangladesh war, but with a population a tenth the size. Proportionate to population, the Khmer Rouge was one of the most murderous governments of all time.

In addition to being dogmatic Communists, the Khmer Rouge leaders were extremely xenophobic. Allied with China, the cut off almost all relations with other countries. The Cambodian army made repeated, unprovoked attacks on villages in neighboring Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. (Numerous Cambodians had also fled to these countries). After repeated provocations, on December 25, 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia to get rid of the Khmer Rouge once and for all. Vietnamese forces were reached Phnom Penh within two weeks and proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, led mostly by former members of the Khmer Rouge. Securing the countryside proved slower and more difficult. In places where Vietnamese control was less than secure, Cambodians faced the possiblity of old rulers being temporarily driven away, only to return and take revenge on anyone who accepted Vietnamese help. Over time, however, the Vietnamese drove the Khmer Rouge back into the areas around the Thai border, where the Khmer Rouge forces joined with remnants of other opponents of Vietnamese occupation and fought a prolonged guerrilla war. Vietnam ruled Cambodia with an occupying army between 120,000 and 200,000, settled numerous Vietnamese in Cambodia, and generally attempted to rule the country as a puppet state. The murderous policies of the Khmer Rouge ended, but Cambodians increasingly began to resent the Vietnamese occupation. The usual estimate of the number of people killed in this war is 30,000 on each side, over a period of 10 years.

If the reaction of the international community (including the United States) was less than edifying in Bangladesh, it was shameful in the case of Cambodia. Cold War politics trumped humanitarian concerns. Because Vietnam was a Soviet ally, the invasion of Cambodia was seen as an indirect act of Soviet aggression. The United Nations General Assembly condemned the invasion and continued to recognize the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of Cambodia. China made a brief punitive invasion of Vietnam. And China, the United States, Thailand and other countries supported anti-Vietnamese guerrillas operating out of Thailand. Although non-Communist groups were included for window dressing, this effectively translated into support for the Khmer Rouge. This support ended with the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and the end of the Cold War. A low-grade civil war remained, which gradually faded out in the 1990's.

Vietnam's motives were also far from pure. The government they installed consisted of dissenting members of the Khmer Rouge, and Vietnam was clearly acting less out of humanitarian motives than a wish to reduce Cambodia to a puppet. The entire episode does credit to no one.

Humanitarian Interventions -- Bangladesh, 1971

One way to turn down the emotional volume on humanitarian interventions and consider them on their own merits, apart from discussions of U.S. policy is to consider humanitarian interventions that did not involve the United States. There were three major examples of such interventions in the 1970's. In 1971 India intervened to support Bangladesh in its war for independence. In 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia to depose the murderous Khmer Rouge. Also in 1979, Tanzania invaded Uganda to depose despot Idi Amin. Let us consider these three examples to see what they teach us about humanitarian intervention. (Usage note: I use the term intervention to mean sending in troops when a war is ongoing and invasion to mean sending in troops in the absence of a pre-existing war. The use of one term or the other is not intended to indicate moral approval or disapproval).

INDIA'S INTERVENTION IN BANGLADESH

Pakistain, pre-1971 was surely one of the least viable countries in the world. Consisting of the Muslim majority areas carved out of India, Pakistan had two separate lobes on opposite sides of the Indian subcontinent with no overland connection. West Pakistan was almost entirely Muslim, but had numerous ethnic groups, while East Pakistan was about 20% Hindu, but ethnically almost entirely Bengali, with a small Bihari minority. Pakistan's two lobes shared a common religion but were completely unlike racially, ethnically, linguistically and culturally. West Pakistan was completely politically dominant, although East Pakistan had the larger population. For most of its history, Pakistan was a military dictatorship, but in 1970 free elections took place. The West Pakistani leadership failed to account for the fact that Bengalis could be counted on to vote uniformly as an oppressed group, yet they formed a majority of the population. As a result an absolute but slim majority of the vote went to the Awami League, a Bengali nationalist organization with a program of East Pakistani autonomy that stopped just short of formal independence. The West Pakistani rulers were unwilling to accept the result and sought to renegotiate the demands for autonomy. Bengalis responded in March, 1971 with a general strike that gradually led to the de-facto takeover of East Pakistan's government by the Awami League, and increasingly to calls for an independent Bangladesh.

The Pakistani army ultimately cracked down, beginning with massacres in Dacca, the capital and then spreading to the countryside. The initial massacres in the city killed thousands, targeting particularly the university, police stations, and slums. The terror spread to the country, where numerous entire villages were destroyed. The remnants of the Bengali army and police launched guerrilla resistance to the occupiers, provoking further savage reprisals. The Pakistani army attempted to turn an ethnic war into a religious war by blaming the rebellion on Bengal's Hindu minority and calling for Muslim solidarity. Many accounts are given of the Pakistani army stripping men below the waist and killing any who were not circumcised (required for Muslims). A few Bengali Muslims joined in the holy war, but most regarded themselves as Bengalis first. The minority Biharis, on the other hand, sided with the West Pakistanis. Bengalis, when they gained the upper hand, massacred Biharis and Biharis, where in the majority, massacred Bengalis. Estimates of the number of people killed range from one million to 3.5 million. An estimated 10 million refugees fled to India.

India provided for the refugees and aided the insurgents, but did not immediately take direct military action. One reason for this was almost certainly that Pakistan had an alliance with China, which would have come to Pakistan's aid if India intervened. The Indian government therefore bided its time, signed an alliance with the Soviet Union, and waited for winter, when the Himalayan passes with be blocked with snow and prevent China taking military action. In December, India launched a blitzkrieg which swept the Pakistani army from the countryside. Within 12 days, the Pakistani forces were holed up in the capital and surrendered. Yet even during that short time, they went on one last killing frenzy, directed specifically against the educated and anyone who might be potential leaders of the new nation. Once triumphant, the Indian forces generally maintained order until the Bengalis were able to take over, but they were not able to prevent savage reprisals by the Bengalis against the collaberationist Bihari minority, and many gruesome murders and massacres took place. Although some early attempts were made to justify India's actions as a humanitarian intervention, the general reaction of the international community (included the United States) was hostile.

Bangladesh became an independent nation, the Awami League took over the structure of government, and India was able to withdraw within a few months. Mujibur Rahman, the winner of the original election, became president. He ultimately proved an inept leader and was overthrown and killed in a coup in 1975. Bangladesh continues to be an improverished, troubled, and turbulant country. But India's two-week war successfully ended the atrocities, and the two countries never developed the sort of hostility that continues between India and Pakistan to this day.

Humanitarian Interventions

The publication of a Johns Hopkins study alleging that approximately 600,000 Iraqis have been killed in the war following the U.S. invasion has touched off an intense controversy over whether the study is accurate.

It has also generated controversy (at least among some people)about the justification of the Iraq war as a humanitarian intervention. The whole topic of humanitarian intervention is controversial to begin with. Some people believe that anyone who does not endorse their favorite war against one tyrant or another is thereby endorsing the tyrant's behavior. Others so hate and fear Great Satan's power that they consider any atrocity to be preferable to U.S. action. I have long intended to post my own views on humanitarian intervention; this seems a good time to proceed.

I share the generally accepted view among serious advocates of humanitarian intervention, that such interventions are justified, but only in case of an immediate humanitarian crisis or the iminent danger of such a crisis. This in turn raises two questions from opposite sides of the divide: (1) why is humanitarian intervention justified at all and (2) why should it be limited to immediate humanitarian crises.

So far as I understand it, the case against humanitarian intervention can take one of two forms. Some people are pacifists and oppose all war regardless of circumstances. Others are opposed to American power and are certain that no atrocity by anyone else can be as bad as action by Great Satan. The pacifist view strikes me as naive. Is it truly better to allow genocide than to use military force to stop it? The other argument is that even humanitarian interventions kill innocents. This is indeed true. And when we drove the Nazis from France, we did cause the French some collateral damage. Would it, then, have been better to let the Nazis remain in order to ensure that we did not kill a single Frenchman. As Allied forces advanced on Nazi concentration camps, their usual response was to step up the killing, and/or to force march the inmates away. But surely it would be absurd to conclude that it would therefore have been better to allow the concentration camps to operate unimpeded because our intervention would only make them worse.

The anyone-but-Great-Satan crowd care nothing for humanitarianism, but only want to condemn whatever the U.S. does, no matter what that is. Many are willing to defend any atrocity so long as committed by enemies of the U.S. They do also have a valid criticism that U.S. actions are unlikely to be motivated by pure humanitarianism, but to have elements of self-interest. But it is hardly realistic to expect any country to dispense with self-interest altogether. Another criticism of humanitarian interventions is the "realist" criticism, that the U.S. should intervene only when vital interests are at stake. But surely the lesson of the past decade and a half is that humanitarian crises do effect our interests, at least potentially. Failed states pose a threat to us because they are the places that harbor terrorists. Humanitarian crises pose a potential threat because the greater the crisis, the greater the threat of radicalization.

So, if one supports the concept of humanitarian intervention, why should it be limited to immediate crises? Why is neither past slaughter nor the potential for future slaughter grounds for intervention? Or, as some put it, why should there be a statute of limitations on genocide?

Well, one answer is that surely the primary object of a humanitarian intervention is to be effective. Intervening when a humanitarian crisis is ongoing or in immediate danger of happening can save people from slaughter. Intervention several years later will not bring the dead back to life.

Another answer is that humanitarian interventions tend to be labor-intensive, and soldiers are a limited resource. The object is not simply to defeat the army that is committing atrocities, but to protect the population from it. Routing a group of thugs that prey on innocents civilians is easy. Stopping them from simply scattering and spreading devastation in their wake is a good deal harder. A successful humanitarian intervention requires securing the entire country, everwhere and everyone. This calls for a lot of troops. And when troops are in limited supply, this necessarily requires rationing of them, which means reserving them for the very worst crises. And if there is not a crisis severe enough to justify humanitarian intervention, it does not logically follow that we should intervene in the next-worst spot. Much better to hold our troops in reserve until a need for them really does arise.

And the other argument against taking humanitarian interventions lightly is that they can go wrong, sometimes disasterously wrong. A humanitarian intervention that fails to secure the country is apt to lead simply to chaos and civil war. Even if successful, securing the country takes time, and war and violence often escalate in the short run. (I intend to pursue this matter further in future posts. Whoever advocates humanitarian intervention needs to take the possibility of failure into account. Only when conditions are so bad that failure is worth the risk is humanitarian intervention justified.

Coming up next: Discussion of real-world humanitarian interventions and possible lessons to learn from them.